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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CORPORATE LAW - FREEZE OUT MERGERS UNDER SECTION 251 OF THE
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW - THE EFFECT OF Singer AND
Tanzer.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law' permits two
domestic corporations to merge where the holders of the majority of the
outstanding voting stock of each corporation approve the merger agree-
ment.2 A corporation that owns a majority of the outstanding voting stock of
another corporation, however, can consummate a merger between the two by
creating a wholly owned subsidiary and merging the subsidiary with the
corporation in which it has a majority stock interest.3 This triangular
process, known as an "interested" merger,4 facilitates a merger since the
parent corporation has majority control of both subsidiaries and can thus be
assured of the merger's approval without having to obtain the approval of
its own shareholders.5
Despite the right of majority stockholders to complete a merger, various
legal challenges have been made available to minority stockholders in an
effort to protect their interests during the transaction. In Delaware, a
majority stockholder stands in a fiduciary relationship with a minority
stockholder when dealing with the property of the corporation.6 Thus, a
minority stockholder can have an "interested" merger enjoined unless the
1. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251 (1974).
2. Id. Section 251 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any two or more corporations existing under the laws of this State may
merge into a single corporation, which may be any one of the constituent
corporations or may consolidate into a new corporation formed by the
consolidation, pursuant to an agreement of merger or consolidation, as the case
may be, complying and approved in accordance with this section.
(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or
consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of a merger or
consolidation....
(c) The agreement required by subsection (b) of this section shall be
submitted to the stockholders of each constituent corporation at an annual or
special meeting for the purpose of acting on the agreement .... At the meeting,
the agreement shall be considered and a vote taken for its adoption or rejection.
If a majority of the outstanding stock of the corporation entitled to vote thereon
shall be voted for the adoption of the agreement, that fact shall be certified on
the agreement by the secretary or assistant secretary of the corporation. If the
agreement shall be so adopted and certified by each constituent corporation, it
shall then, in addition to the execution required by subsection (b) of this section,
be executed, acknowledged and filed and shall become effective, in accordance
with § 103 of this title. ...
Id. Cf. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974) (permitting a merger by a vote of the board of
directors of a corporation which owns more than 90% of the stock of another
corporation). For a discussion of § 253, see text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
3. See text accompanying notes 22-28 & 42-45 infra.
4. See E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 333 (1972).
5. See text accompanying notes 22-28 & 42-45 infra.
6. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107,
109-10 (Del. 1952).
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majority stockholder proves that the merger is fair to the minority
shareholders.' The fairness of a merger has usually been challenged in the
context of conversion ratios between the stock of the constituent and
surviving corporations, or the liquidation value of stock of the merged
corporation. 8
The merger agreement must state the consideration to be given for the
shares of each of the constituent corporations.9 There is no requirement,
however, that the consideration be in the form of stock or securities in the
surviving corporation, 0 and, consequently, stockholders of one of the
constituent corporations may be "frozen out" of any interest in the surviving
corporation." A stockholder who is dissatisfied with the cash value offered
for his shares in a constituent corporation may petition the Delaware Court
of Chancery to appraise the value of his stock and compel the surviving
corporation to pay him the appraised value.12 The court is to determine the
fair value of the shares without consideration of the merger and may, in its
discretion, permit pretrial discovery by either of the parties.' 3
The challenges available to a minority stockholder have proved to be
largely ineffective, however, due to the reluctance of the Delaware courts to
7. Id. In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del.
1952), the Supreme Court of Delaware noted that the liquidation value of the merged
corporation's stock was not the sole criterion to be applied in determining the merger's
fairness. Id. at 305, 93 A.2d at 113. Rather, in arriving "at a judgment of the fairness
of the merger, all of its terms must be considered." Id. at 305, 93 A.2d at 114, quoting
Porges v. Vadsco Sales Corp., 27 Del. Ch. 127, 134, 32 A.2d 148, 151 (1943).
8. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107,
109-10 (Del. 1952). See also note 14 infra.
9. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(b)(4) (1974). Section 251(b)(4) provides:
(b) The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or
consolidate shall adopt a resolution approving an agreement of merger or
consolidation. The agreement shall state: (4) the manner of converting the shares
of each of the constituent corporations into shares or other securities of the
corporation surviving or resulting from the merger or consolidation and, if any
shares of any of the constituent corporation are not to be converted solely into
shares or other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation, the cash,
property, rights or securities of any other corporation which the holders of such
shares are to receive in exchange for, or upon conversion of such shares and the
surrender of the certificates evidencing them, which cash, property, rights or
securities of any other corporation may be in addition to or in lieu of shares or
other securities of the surviving or resulting corporation ....
Id.
10. Id.
11. A "freeze out," in the broad sense, has been described as "any action by those
in control of the corporation which results in the termination of a stockholder's
interest in the enterprise." Vorenburg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's
Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192 (1964). Specifically, "[t]he term has
come to imply a purpose to force a liquidation or sale of the stockholder's shares, not
incident to some other wholesome business goal." Id. at 1192-93.
A freeze-out merger may be employed to expel a dissident stockholder who
refuses to sell his stock in the corporation. Id. at 1197. Many corporations sold stock to
the public at high prices in the late 1960's, and are now utilizing freeze-out mergers to
reacquire this same stock at the lower prices currently prevailing on the stock market.
See Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases, 30
Bus. LAw. 699 (1975); Note, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
12. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974).
13. Id. § 262(f).
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find mergers unfair,14 and the frequent failure of appraisal proceedings to
result in the stockholder's receipt of the actual value of his shares.'5 In
addition, the United States Supreme Court, in a recent case involving the
merger of two Delaware corporations, refused to sustain a private action
brought by a minority stockholder under rule 10b-516 even though there may
have existed a breach of the majority stockholder's fiduciary duty to the
minority interest under state law.17 Against this background of the failure of
dissatisfied minority stockholders to contest a merger successfully, the
Supreme Court of Delaware decided two cases in 1977, Singer v. Magnavox
Co.'s and Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.,19 which
emphasized the fiduciary duty of the majority stockholder in a merger with
respect to the purposes of the merger,20 and supplemented the claims and
defenses available in this area of the law. 21 This article will examine the
Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Singer and Tanzer to determine their
collective impact on Delaware corporate law.
II. THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT'S DECISIONS IN
Singer AND Tanzer
In 1974, North American Philips Corporation (North American)
incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary, North American Philips Develop-
ment Corporation (Development), for the purpose of making a tender offer
14. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel'Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del.
1952) (merger between parent corporation and its subsidiary sustained on ground that
the proposed plan of exchanging shares of the corporations on a share-for-share basis
was not fraudulent or unfair); Greene v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch.
1971) (where value of cash and debentures to be issued, on merger of subsidiary and
parent, to minority stockholders of subsidiary approximated market price of
subsidiary's shares, the merger was not so grossly unfair to minority stockholders of
subsidiary as to require a preliminary injunction of the merger); Bruce v. E. L. Bruce
Co., 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961) (complaint by minority stockholders of merged
corporation to enjoin merger on the ground of gross undervaluation of stock in the
exchange ratio was insufficient to state a cause of action). See also Stauffer v.
Standard Brands Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962). For a discussion of
Stauffer, see text accompanying notes 83-87 infra.
15. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the appraisal remedy, see Green v.
Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1297 n.4 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977);
Vorenburg, supra note 11, at 1200-05.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
17. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, two
corporations had merged under DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974). 430 U.S. at 465. For a
discussion of a § 253 merger, see text accompanying notes 83-87 infra. Plaintiff, a
minority stockholder, was discontent with the amount of cash offered for his shares
by the resulting corporation and brought suit in federal court to enjoin the merger as a
violation of rule 10b-5, instead of pursuing his appraisal remedy. See 430 U.S. at
466-67. In reversing the Second Circuit's determination that a claim for relief had
been stated, the Court held that no rule 10b-5 violation exists unless a breach of the
fiduciary duty by majority stockholders is accompanied by "deception, misrepresenta-
tion, or nondisclosure." Id. at 471, 476.
18. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
19. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
20. See text accompanying notes 32 & 50-51 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 67 & 69 infra.
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for the common shares of the Magnavox Company (Magnavox).22 After the
directors of Magnavox rejected Development's initial tender offer, 23 a
modified offer was made which was not opposed.2 4 As a result, Development
acquired 84.1 percent of Magnavox's outstanding common stock.
25
Development acquired all the equity interest in Magnavox by creating a
wholly owned subsidiary, T.M.C. Development Corporation (T.M.C.), which
it merged with Maganvox pursuant to section 251.26 Under the terms of the
merger, holders of Magnavox common stock other than Development were
to receive cash - $9.00 per share of Magnavox common stock held by
them.27 They were informed that if they objected to this amount they could
seek appraisal.2 8
Owners of Magnavox common stock at the time of the merger 29 filed suit
in the Delaware Court of Chancery against the four companies involved,
alleging, inter alia, that: 1) the merger served no business purpose other
than to force the removal of public shareholders from an equity position in
Magnavox at an inadequate price and to permit North American, through
Development, to obtain sole ownership of Magnavox; and 2) the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties to the minority shareholders by approving
the merger at a cash price for Magnavox's stock that was grossly
inadequate. 30 The Court of Chancery granted defendants' motion to
dismiss.31
22. 380 A.2d at 971.
23. Id. The directors opposed this initial offer due to the inadequate price offered
for the Magnavox common shares. Id.
24. Id. In the modified offer, the price for the common stock was increased and 16
officers of Magnavox were assured of two-year employment contracts. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 971-72. For the relevant text of § 251, see note 2 supra.
27. 380 A.2d at 972. The book value of Magnavox common stock at the time of the
merger was $10.16 per share. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 971. Plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all holders of common
stock in Magnavox on the day before the merger. Id.
30. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). Plaintiffs also claimed that the merger violated
the anti-fraud provisions of the Delaware Securities Act, DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 7303
(Supp. 1977). 367 A.2d at 1353. The Court of Chancery dismissed this count of the
complaint, holding that the sale and purchase of plaintiffs stock pursuant to the
terms of the merger were not caused by any false representation or material omission
in the proxy statement. Id. at 1360-61.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Court of Chancery's
dismissal of this claim on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 380 A.2d at
982. The plaintiffs were Pennsylvania residents who had not been solicited by proxies
in Delaware, and the actual sale of securities had not occurred in Delaware. Id. at 981.
The fact that the merger vote had taken place in Delaware was "too fragile a basis on
which to establish subject matter jurisdiction." Id.
31. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). In regard to the first count, the Court of
Chancery stated that no precedent in Delaware law required a "proper and
independent business purpose for the merger of a corporation in order to justify the
elimination of its minority shareholders." 367 A.2d at 1357. The court specifically
1162 [VOL. 23
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On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the dismissal,
holding that an allegation that a section 251 merger was entered into for the
sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders "states a cause of action
for violation of a fiduciary duty for which the Court may grant such relief as
it deems appropriate under the circumstances. '32 Further, the court held that
even if a merger is not made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
stockholders, the majority's fiduciary obligation to the minority remains.33
The court must scrutinize the transaction to determine its overall fairness,
and may enjoin the merger if it is determined to be unfair to the minority
stockholders.34
In its analysis, the court recognized that the defendents had satisfied
the statutory requirements of a section 251 merger,35 but concluded that
literal compliance with the statute did not render the transaction "legally
unassailable. ' 36 The examination of the business purpose for a merger,
noted the court, was not helpful as a "threshold consideration ... in sorting
out the rights of the parties. ' '3 7 In addition, the court determined that the
defendants, as majority stockholders, could not fulfill their fiduciary duties
to the plaintiffs "simply by relegating them to a statutory appraisal
declined to adopt the "business purpose" test promulgated in other jurisdictions. Id. at
1356. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
With respect to the second count, the court noted that the plaintiffs' basis for
this count was the alleged inadequacy of the price paid for plaintiffs' shares under the
terms of the merger agreement, and concluded that in such a case, the plaintiffs'
remedy was to seek an appraisal of their shares under DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 262 (1974).
367 A.2d at 1362. See notes 12 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
32. 380 A.2d at 980.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 975. For the pertinent text of § 251, see note 2 supra.
36. 380 A.2d at 975. The Singer court adopted the analysis employed in Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971), and Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch.
255, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), to "reject the contention that statutory compliance
insulates the merger from judicial review." 380 A.2d at 975.
In Schnell, the management of a company changed its bylaws to advance the
date of the annual stockholders' meeting and thereby prevented the plaintiffs from
waging a proxy fight against the management. 285 A.2d at 438-39. The court found
that management utilized the corporate machinery and the law for the purpose of
perpetuating itself in office and concluded that "inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible." Id. at 439.
In Guth, it was alleged that an officer of a corporation usurped a corporate
opportunity for his personal benefit. 23 Del. Ch. at 266-67, 5 A.2d at 508-09. The court
stated that "[tihe question is not one to be decided on narrow or technical grounds, but
upon broad considerations of corporate duty and loyalty." Id. at 273, 5 A.2d at 511.
37. 380 A.2d at 976. The court stated, however, that
[t]he point ... is not that an exploration of the business purpose is without
merit. It may well be necessary to examine that purpose in many mergers under
judicial review .... It seems to us, rather, that the approach to the purpose issue
should be made by first examining the competing claims between the majority
and minority stockholders of Magnavox.
Id. For a discussion of the "business purpose" test, see notes 59-62 and accompanying
text infra.
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proceeding." 38 Finally, the court rejected the contention by the defendants
that a stockholder's rights in stock are "exclusively in the value of his
investment, not its form"39 as inconsistent with the fiduciary duty owed by
the defendants to the plaintiffs.
40
Within one month of the Singer decision, the Delaware Supreme Court
decided Tanzer, which involved a factual situation quite similar to Singer.4 '
International General Industries, Inc. (IGI) owned 81 percent of the stock of
Kliklok Corporation (Kliklok).42 In 1975, IGI formed KLK Corporation (KLK)
in order to acquire all of Kliklok's common stock through a merger between
KLK and Kliklok. 43 The board of directors of each company approved the
merger, and the stockholders of KLK and Kliklok confirmed the merger in
accordance with section 251. 44 By the terms of the merger agreement, IGI
was to acquire all of the stock of the surviving corporation, and the minority
shareholders of Kliklok were to receive $11.00 per share of Kliklok stock.45
Plaintiffs, stockholders in Kliklok, filed suit in the Delaware Court of
Chancery, alleging "that the merger should be enjoined because the sole
purpose thereof was to serve the interest of the parent."46 The Chancellor
38. 380 A.2d at 977 (footnote omitted). In describing the fiduciary duty owed by
the majority stockholders, the court adopted the standard used for corporate directors,
stating:
While technicially not trustees, . [corporate directors] stand in fiduciary
relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through
the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and
motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director,
peremptory and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only
affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge,
but also to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability
might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the reasonable and lawful
exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest. The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal
conduct are many and varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The
standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed scale.
Id., quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). The
court concluded that while this definition pertained to directors, "the spirit of the
definition is equally applicable to a majority stockholder in any context in which the
law imposes a fiduciary duty on that stockholder for the benefit of minority
stockholders." 380 A.2d at 977.
39. 380 A.2d at 977 (emphasis in original).
40. Id. at 977-78. In a separate opinion, Justice McNeilly concurred in the result
and emphasized that an alleged violation of the Singer rule shifts "the burden to the
majority to establish the entire fairness of the transaction." Id. at 982 (McNeilly, J.,
concurring). He further stated that "[t]o determine whether that burden has been met
I think the Court must scrutinize the business purpose, or economic necessity,
desirability and feasibility involved, evidence of self-serving, manipulation, or
overreaching, and all other relevant factors of intrinsic fairness or unfairness." Id.
41. Singer was decided on September 23, 1977, and Tanzer was decided on
October 18, 1977.
42. 379 A.2d at 1122.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1122-23. The minority stockholders also had appraisal rights under
§262. Id. at 1123. See notes 12 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
46. 379 A.2d at 1122.
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found that the sole reason for the merger was to facilitate long term debt
financing by IGI,47 and refused to grant the requested relief.48
On appeal, 49 the Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed, holding that "a
merger made primarily to advance the business purpose of the majority
stockholder" s is not a violation of the fiduciary duty owed by the majority
stockholder to a minority stockholder. 51 In reaching this conclusion, the
court did not consider the merger itself in terms of its "business purpose,"
since it did not view this standard as helpful.5 2 Rather, the court focused
upon the powers and rights of IGI as a stockholder of Kliklok,53 and stated
that "a stockholder in a Delaware corporation has a right to vote his shares
in his own interest, including the expectation of personal profit, limited, of
course, by any duty he owes to other stockholders. ' 54 The court did note,
however, that the majority stockholder's motives in ratifying a merger must
be bona fide and not a subterfuge for eliminating minority stockholders.55
Moreover, the court stated that notwithstanding the existence of a bona fide
purpose, the majority stockholder still has to bear the burden of proving the
fairness of the merger in order to satisfy the fiduciary duty it owes to the
minority stockholders. 56
47. Id. at 1124.
48. Id. at 1125. The Court of Chancery, in an unreported opinion denying the
requested preliminary injunction, stated:
The question presented is whether the merger should be enjoined because
the purpose is to serve the interest of the parent. It should be noted in this regard
that IGI has a legitimate and present and compelling business reason to be the
sole owner of Kliklok. IGI is not freezing out the minority just for the purpose of
freezing out the minority.'
Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 n.5 (Del. 1977), quoting Tanzer v.
International Gen. Indus., Inc., Del. Ch. C. A. 4945 (Dec. 23, 1975), aff'd and
remanded, 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
49. In response to defendant's contention that the case was not appealable on the
merits, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that although the Court of Chancery had
not made a summary judgment ruling, that court, in denying a preliminary
injunction, had "determined a substantial issue and established a legal right between
the parties." 379 A.2d at 1122. Thus, "the interlocutory order [met] the test of
appealability." Id.
50. Id. It should be noted that the Delaware Supreme Court expressly indicated
that it was answering a question left unresolved by Singer - whether a merger made
primarily to advance the business purpose of a majority stockholder is a violation of
its fiduciary duty. Id.
51. Id. at 1124-25.
52. Id. at 1123. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text infra.
53. 379 A.2d at 1123-24.
54. Id. at 1124. As support for this conclusion, the court noted previous Delaware
cases where the stockholders had voted their shares in their own interest. Id. at 1123.
See Ringling Bros. - Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610,
53 A.2d 441 (Del. 1947) (stockholders may lawfully contract with one another to vote
as they or a majority of their group determine); Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17
Del. Ch. 214, 151 A. 303 (1930) (stockholder may use his own judgment in voting and
may include personal profit in the motives which determine his choice, if the
advantage thereby obtained is not at the expense of other stockholders). See generally
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2031 (rev. perm.
ed. 1976).
55. 379 A.2d at 1124. The court stated that if the real purpose of the merger was to
eliminate unwanted minority stockholders, this would constitute a violation of the
Singer rule. Id.
56. Id. at 1125. See notes 7 & 33-34 and accompanying text supra.
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Recognizing that the Court of Chancery found that the primary reason
for the merger was to benefit long term debt financing by IGI, and not to
freeze out the minority stockholders of Kliklok, the Delaware Supreme Court
concluded that no violation of the Singer rule existed.5 7 Consequently, the
court affirmed the lower court's decision, but remanded the case for a
determination of the fairness of the merger.58
III. Singer, Tanzer, AND THE BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST
In Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co.,59 the Fifth Circuit adopted a "business
purpose" test to determine the validity of freeze-out mergers.6 In Bryan, an
ex-employee who refused to relinquish his 15 percent stockholdings in Brock
& Blevins Company was frozen out of that corporation as a result of a
merger between the corporation and Power Erectors Inc., a subsidiary that
was created by Brock & Blevins Company for the sole purpose of
accomplishing the merger.61 The Fifth Circuit concluded that "[in the
absence of [a] business purpose Power Erectors was purely a sham party
created to circumvent the rule of law that prohibits a majority of
stockholders of a corporation ... to force the minority interests to surrender
their stock holdings. '62
57. 379 A.2d at 1124-25. See text accompanying notes 32-34 & 47 supra.
58. 379 A.2d at 1125.
59. 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
60. 490 F.2d at 570; see note 62 and accompanying text infra.
61. 490 F.2d at 565-68.
62. Id. at 570. The court further stated:
Implicit in [the district court's] holding was a construction of the Georgia statute
that comports with equity in good conscience. Such construction would read out
of the statute a situation where there was no pre-existing corporation to be
merged, but instead where such corporation was created solely for the purpose of
accomplishing an illegal result.
Id. See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Fla.
1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975). In Grimes, the plaintiff, a minority
stockholder, was frozen out of a corporation as a result of a merger between his
corporation and the wholly owned subsidiary of the majority stockholder, another
corporation. 392 F. Supp. at 1395. The court found that there were valid business
reasons for the merger, since money would be saved by both companies and a conflict
of interest problem would be eliminated. Id. at 1402. Therefore, the court denied
plaintiffs request to enjoin the merger and found no need to apply the Bryan rule. Id.
at 1402, 1404.
Other jurisdictions have also utilized the "business purpose" test in merger
cases. The Second and Eighth Circuits have applied the "business purpose" test in
determining whether federal securities laws have been violated. Polin v. Conductron
Corp., 552 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric
Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), rehearing en banc denied, 533 F.2d 1309 (2d Cir.),
vacated, 429 U.S. 881 (1976). However, these decisions have been effectively overruled
by Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See note 17 and accompanying
text supra.
Several state courts had read the "business purpose" test into recent
decisions. See Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975);
Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc. 2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957 (1976). Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit recently certified a merger case to the Indiana Supreme Court in order
to ascertain whether the "business purpose" test is to be employed in the
interpretation of Indiana corporate law. Gabhart v. Gabhart, 545 F.2d 877 (7th Cir.
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The Supreme Court of Delaware, in the Singer and Tanzer decisions,
refused to apply the "business purpose" test, 3 concluding that "it states a
result and not a right or a duty."' "4 The court noted that the "business
purpose" rule is ambiguous, since it "leads to such questions as: 'Whose
purpose?' or 'Whose business?' ' 65 Instead of relying on the "business
purpose" test, the court preferred to examine the competing claims of the
majority and minority stockholders and then apply the test only if it would
be helpful.66
As a result of Singer, a minority stockholder who alleges that the sole
purpose of a merger is to terminate his interest in the corporation has a
valid cause of action grounded upon a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by
the majority stockholder. 67 In Tanzer, however, the court held that a freeze-
out merger would not violate the fiduciary duty of the majority stockholder if
it were made primarily to further a bona fide business purpose of the
majority stockholder.68 Thus, Tanzer seems to create a defense to a case
brought under the Singer principle, since proof of a legitimate business
purpose will satisfy the majority stockholder's fiduciary obligation,6 9 subject
to the requirement of the general fairness of the transaction. 70
Although the Supreme Court of Delaware refused to apply the "business
purpose" test,71 it is submitted that both decisions focused on the purposes of
the challenged mergers. Singer and Tanzer therefore appear to have
implicitly adopted the "business purpose" test. When a plaintiff alleges a
cause of action under Singer, the court must determine whether the sole
purpose of the merger is to freeze out the plaintiff. To make this
determination, the court must resolve whether or not there exists a valid
business purpose for merging the constituent corporations. 72 Moreover, since
a bona fide purpose of the majority stockholder will also serve as a defense
to a freeze-out merger, 73 the Supreme Court of Delaware has, in effect,
liberalized the "business purpose" test. However, no guidance, general or
specific, was given as to what constitutes a valid purpose. Indeed, the only
sure ground on which to base an opinion is that the long term debt
financing of a majority stockholder will serve as an adequate purpose for a
freeze-out merger.74
1977). For other discussions of the "business purpose" test, see Kessler, supra note 11;
Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders From Freezeouts through Merger, 22
WAYNE L. REv. 1421 (1976).
63. 379 A.2d at 1123; 380 A.2d at 975-76.
64. 379 A.2d at 1123.
65. 380 A.2d at 976; see 379 A.2d at 1123:
66. 380 A.2d at 976; see 379 A.2d at 1123.
67. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 50 & 51 supra.
69. 379 A.2d at 1124.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
72. The presence of a valid business purpose would necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the sole purpose of the merger was not to freeze out minority
stockholders. See Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
73. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
74. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
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The issue of the extent of judicial inquiry into the motives of the
majority stockholder was not resolved by these two decisions. In Tanzer, the
Supreme Court of Delaware sustained the merger on the ground that it
would facilitate long term debt financing by IGI, the majority stockholder.7 5
Since most mergers could be construed in some manner as helpful to a
corporation's long term debt financing,76 it appears that the implicit
"business purpose" test adopted by the court can easily be satisfied by a
corporate defendant.77 Furthermore, a wide variety of commercial advan-
tages may inure to the benefit of the surviving corporation as a result of a
merger, many of which may prevent the application of the Singer doctrine.78
If the fiduciary duties imposed by Singer can be easily met as a result of
Tanzer and the attitude of the Delaware courts, then the law has not really
been altered in favor of the minority stockholder. There will have to be
continued reliance on the nebulous fairness standard,79 under which the
minority shareholders have not been very successful in obtaining relief.8°
Finally, notwithstanding the apparent ease with which the Tanzer court
found a bona fide business purpose on the part of the majority stockholder, 81
if the degree of scrutiny to be given a merger is left to individual courts,
varying and inconsistent decisions will likely result.
75. See text accompanying notes 57 & 58 supra.
76. For example, the merger of two corporations could leave the surviving
corporation in a better cash position, thus enabling it to make sinking fund payments,
redemptions, interest payments, and payments for the debt at maturity with greater
ease, or at least without having to borrow. The acquisition of liquid assets by a merger
would serve the same ends.
The acquisition of another company's assets may also make it easier for a
corporation to effectuate the terms of an indenture. Similarly, the increase in assets
could make the corporation's debentures more attractive to the public, since debenture
holders will seek payment from the corporation's assets in the event of default,
insolvency, or bankruptcy. See also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON
CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQuismTIONS 103-43 (1955).
77. The majority stockholder in a freeze-out merger situation is often a
corporation. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78
(Del. 1962); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952);
Greene v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); Bruce v. E. L. Bruce Co.,
40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (1961).
78, Other purposes which could conceivably be furthered by a corporate merger
include the ability of the corporation to pay dividends, an increase in the market
value of the surviving corporation's stock, the relief of a cash flow problem, the
acquisition of certain assets of the merged corporation, or the facilitation of extension
into other commercial or industrial areas by the surviving corporation. See FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS 103-43
(1955).
79. See text accompanying notes 34 & 56 supra. See also notes 14-21 and
accompanying text supra.
80. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 50-51 & 57 supra.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The application of the Singer rationale to areas of corporate law other
than section 251 mergers82 is difficult to predict. In a case decided prior to
Singer, Stauffer v. Standard Brand8, Inc.,83 a minority stockholder contested
the validity of a merger under section 253,84 which permits a corporation
that owns more than 90 percent of the stock of another corporation to merge
with that corporation by a vote of its board of directors.8 5 The Supreme
Court of Delaware refused to invalidate the merger, stating that "the very
purpose of the statute is to provide the parent corporation with a means of
eliminating the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise. '8 6
However, the Court of Chancery recently applied the Singer rationale and
granted a preliminary injunction in two cases where minority stockholders
sued to enjoin a section 253 merger.8 7
Language in the Singer opinion to the effect that a stockholder's interest
in his investment is not restricted solely to its value,88 and that the fiduciary
duty of the majority stockholder cannot be satisfied by relegation of the
minority stockholder to appraisal proceedings, 89 indicates the possible
extension of the Singer rationale to stock repurchases by the corporation
and/or the majority stockholder, redemption of stock holdings, and
restrictions placed upon the transfer of stock. In each of these situations, the
82. For the relevant text of § 251, see note 2 supra.
83. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
84. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 253 (1974).
85. Id.; see 41 Del. Ch. at 8, 187 A.2d at 79.
86. 41 Del. Ch. at 10-11, 187 A.2d at 80.
87. Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1978); Kemp v. Angel, 381
A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). In Kemp, INA Corp., through a series of transactions,
acquired 90.6 percent of the outstanding stock of Aid, Inc. (Aid), and merged Aid with
a wholly owned subsidiary pursuant to § 253. Id. at 241-42. Plaintiffs, minority
stockholders of Aid, were offered $14.00 per share of Aid stock held by them. Id. at
243. A preliminary injunction enjoining the merger was requested on the grounds that
the merger was "designed fraudulently to eliminate the interests of the minority
stockholders of Aid, Inc., in their corporation." Id. at 241. The Chancellor did not feel
bound by the decision in Stauffer, and granted the preliminary injunction, stating
that he failed
to see how a determination as to whether or not the duty now imposed on a
majority stockholder in a merger based on 8 Del. C. Section 253 has been
properly carried out requires any less scrutiny by the Trial Court than that called
for in a case in which the rights of minority stockholders have been allegedly
diminished by a merger based on 8 Del. C. Section 251.
Id. at 244.
In Najjar, where a merger was accomplished under § 253, the defendants
sought to distinguish Kemp on the basis that fraud had not been alleged by the
plaintiffs. 387 A.2d at 711-12. The Chancellor refused to grant defendants motion to
dismiss, stating:
[W]hen a complaint attacking a merger "alleges" that its sole purpose is to
eliminate minority interests, such a complaint is now virtually immune from a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, especially when the basis
for such a motion would be, as here, that the plaintiff is only complaining about
the amount paid for the minority shares.
Id. at 712.
88. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
89. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
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